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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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1~HE

EL\lEH .I. HICIIIXS, BL1'icNCHE
K H ll' II i .:\' S, aud ZELLA F.
fIAHlUES,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

:\fFHLE H. S'l'R UIIS and JACKIE
STHl'lIS, his wife,
Dcfc11dants (//Id Respondents,

Case No.
10402

vs.

LESLIE C. GOLD all<l FLORIS C.
(;OLD, his wife; 'YILLIA::\I F.

SALT and DELLA JO SALT, his
1rife, a11d CLAHA ~I. 'VHIPPLE,
Third-Part.I/ Defendants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

PRELil\IINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
1

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff's for an
injunction enjoining defendants from preventing plaintiffs from using a common driveway between the properties of plaintiffs and defendants.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,¥ER COURT
The case was tried to the court. The cross claims
against third-party defendants were dismissed with
prejudice. From a judgment for defendants dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice and granting defendants' counterclaim quieting title as to the claimed
easement, plaintiffs appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and judg·
ment in their favor granting the injunction prayed for.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The subject matter of this lawsuit is a common
driveway constructed on the boundary line between th.e
properties of the parties in Killian SuhdiYision, :En11 •
gration Canyon, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
This driveway was originally constructed by the pre.decessors of the parties in approximately 1918. The ongi-
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111.1.1g1: u1 er

the neck was collstructed from railroad
Lil' a11 ;1 used thereafter. In approximately 1937 the
L'()Ullty i11scrrc1l a cuJycrt aild constructed a fill drive\\'a\' iu the approximate location of the original bridge.
Tl;en: \las joit1t peaceful use of the driveway by the
predecessors aud the parties for approximately 45 years.
i;.tl

Plaintiffs' predecessor, L ...i:'L Jones, took title from
the .Ernigrat io11 Canyon Improvement Company to a
lol descrihe1l as the:

"L<rn er Half of the Upper Half, and the
Cpper Half of the Lower Half, Lot 33, Block
:.!, Killia11 Subdivision, Emigration Canyon, Salt
Lake County, Utah"
rm July L Hl12. (Exhibit P-7). Jones testified that

the following year he built a cabin on the lot (R. 83)
aud the following year the YVhipples built a cabin on
the do1111stream lot. The \Vhipple property is described
as:
"The Upper or Northern Half of Lot 31,
IJlo<'k 2, Killian Subdivision and the Lower or
Sontherly Half of the Lower or Southerly Half
of Lot 33, Block 2, Killian Subdivision." (Exhibits P-1, D-9).

The properties are adjacent with the stream coming
JCT:is~ and to the front and a County road rmwhl,,
'
..
b
....
]Jaralleliug the stream on the other side of the stream
from lhe hot1ses. with one driveway from the road over
the stream. (Exhibits P-1, P-4<, P-5). Jones' wife was
the si:>tn of \Vhipple. (R. 97).
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Jones testified as to the construction of the origin~\
bridge in 1918 after a railroad track in the area had
been dismantled. ( R. 84-88) :
"Q. And did you do anything with the railroad
ties?

A. My son and the ''TJ1ipples, they went up aud
got the railroad ties that was left there anrl
made a bridge, a wooden bridge.

Q. Did they make this out of the railroad ties~

A. Yes.
Q. Did you use the bridge to go in and out to
your cabin?
A. That is the only way we could get into tlw
cabin on that bridge.

*

*

*

Q. Where was the property line on the

bridge~

A. Well, I think we had about a third of it, or
maybe a little better. I can't tell you.

*

*

*

A. First one. Well, the Whipples and my son.
I think he helped them take the ties. from up
on the hill down there to fix the bmlge, and
we all used it conjointly.

Q. Now, about when was that that that bridge
was built?
A. That would be about 1918, about the time
of the war.
Q. What did you use the bridge for, I mean 1'i
the way of vehicular traffic? Did you uir
cars in those days?
4

;-\. Cou l<lti't get across the stream there without
a lmdge in there.
(~.

,,uJ

right. Djd you drive cars across it?

A. Y cs, that's right.
Q. Now, when did you do that?

A. \\r ell. HHS would be-I don't remember the
year. It might have been '19 or 1920. I can't
tell you. See, my brother-in-law used to take
me up there because I never had a car at that
~.

clllle.

*

*

*

Q. Did you continue to use the bridge m that
manner in the years after 1918?

A. After HHS, oh, yes.
Q. And do you recall when the bridge was bken
down and replaced with a culvert?

A. " 7 ith a new one?

Q. Yes.
A. That would be 1936, I think. 1936.

Q. Around 1936? 'Vho put the culvert in?
A. YVell, the road crew that built the new road,
I went up there and talked to him, and he
said, '"\Vell, we will put you a bridge right
there.' so we had it put there so Mr. YVhipple
and I could use that coniointly.

Q. Did ~'OU show them where to put the culYert?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Thf' bridge?

A. Yes.
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Q. Or I mean the roadway. 'Vas it in-enn \'Ol
describe to us ·where this roadml\' \las (;\t1l
the culvert with respect to where. tlie brirlrre
had been before that? YV as it in the sai~c
place as the bridge?
A. No. It's just a little closer to the house.

Q. But is it in the same place with respect to

the property lines?
A. Yes."
Mr.Jones testified that he obtained a car approximntel)'
two years after the bridge was built in 1918. (R 93),
There was no conflict in the evidence that the bridge
and the drive were used peaceably and jointly b~' the
parties from and after the original bridge was rnnstructed up until the time when defendant l\Ierle R
Struhs constructed a fence and pre\'ented plaintiff>
from using the driveway. Struhs constructed the fence
in the summer of 1962. (R. 64)<' (Exhibits P-4, P-j),
There is no conflict in the evidence as to the fad
that work was done from time to time by the families
of both property owners, consisting mainly of putting
shale on the roadway and removing obstructions from
the culvert. Work was also done in shoring up the
entrance and exit to the culvert. The main dispute between the parties was as to the extent of the work done
by the various predecessors and parties.
On February 18, 1952, L. A. Jones cumeyed the
property in question to his daughters, Zella Fa~- Harries, Blanche Evelyn Richins, Mary Maxine Clar~
b

:JIJ(l Bornw' ,Jo~·cT Gray. (E.xhibit P-2). On April rn,
l!l.}7, Mary Jla.\i;1e Clark and

Bonnie Joyce Gray
n t claimed their i11tere;t to Blanche Evelyn Ilichins
11 1
and Elmer J. Hichins. (P-0). Clara M. 'Vhipple conre\'eil lhe lo\\er property to \Villiam F. t:Jalt and Della
Jo. Salt, his wife, 011 ::\lay 29, 1956. (Exhibit D-9).
Struhs obtained the property from Leslie C. Gold and
Flora C. Cold, who hafl obtained the property from
tlw Saits. Str1il1s testified that he obtained the property
in early IHGO. ( R. H5).
Slrnhs ('()llstruded the fence after having a purported suney made by George B. Gudgell of Busch
& Uuugell. Inc. (Exhibit D-11). Struhs claimed that
this snney established a boundary line between the
properties in accordance with where he later built the
fence. It can be seen that the survey on its face cannot
establish any property line, since it shows that the
property is. according to the legal description, on the
other side of the highway. The only basis for the boundm-r i.~ n measuremeut made by the stirYeyor from an
old iron rod 25 feet below the purported boundary.
Acconlingl~·. there was no reliable evidence produced
at trial to establish the exact location of the boundary
line betwee11 the properties in question. Richins an~l
.Tones both testified that they had thought the boundnry
line: between lhe properties was established by a line
from hrn small trees approximately two feet north of
lhe Strnh" house to the back corner of the Struhs house.
nt 88, 8!)) . .f ones testified that the original property
1111
t La<l Leen shown to him hy a l\1r. !larding, who
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informed him that the line was from the small trtr 111
a stake on the opposite side of the old wood hridol
"'
the stake having been obliterated when the County put
in the culvert. (R. 89). Richins testified that ~ume 'iim
after Struhs moved in, he had a conversation wit\ 1
Struhs in which Struhs asked him where the propert)
line was and that he had pointed out the line from tlir
tree close to the front of the Struhs house bad: to tJi,:
back _corner and extending out so that part of t!tc
driveway was included on the Richins side of the
property. Struhs admitted that he had placed llie fenrp
along a line other than the line clairnecl by Richins.
(R. 151). Mrs. Whipple denied any knowledge 111
such a property line as described by Jones and Rid1i111.
However, on cross examination she testified that sl1e
had thought that the boundary line was on the other
side of the driveway; however, she testified further a.1
follows: (R. 115)

"Q. But you didn't know for sure exactly
it was did you?

\Yhm

A. I didn't bother about it."
Mrs. Whipple further testified concerning a stah
where she thought the property line was and when asked
how far the stake was from the edge of the bridge, she
stated that she could not tell. ( R. 101).
William N. Whipple, the son of Mrs. Wl1ipplr.
testified that he recalled that the Joneses had helped
haul in shale and had worked on the driveway. ill
118) . He also admitted that Richins had pPrforwril
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ork uu the: driveway. (R. 121). And in regard to
Iir:ther or not he bad e,·er heard any discussion as to
11
\\'liose property the driveway was on, 'Vhipple testiiieJ: (R. 121)
11

"Q. To your recollection was there ever any
disc11ssion or indication that the road was the
property of the \Vhipples rather than the
property of the Joneses?
1\. l dmi't think
brought up."

I eYer remember it being

Doris \V. Pettit, the daughter of l\Irs. 'Vhipple,
tPstified in regard to when the bridge was first built.
(R. 135):
Xow, how did you get from the road into
your place?
A. \Yell, my uncles and - well, everybody
pitched in and hauled down logs from-they
took all the best ones and all the ones close
to the road, vou know, and they left a lot of
them up at the·

"(~.

<-l. \Veil, what are you referring to as logs?
A. Ties.
Q. Ties. I see. From the railroad bed?
1\. Uh huh.
Q. !lnd when you referred to 'they all pitched
111 ancl helped' would you name the people?
'They' cloesn't help us much.

A. \Veil, lTndc Lee.
C~. No\\', would that be l\Ir. Jones?
A. Yes, and oh, there was mv dad and Uncle
C:il awl Uncle Dan and-·***"
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Photographs (P-4, P-5) show the driveway is ;11
an opening of the brush and trees in front of the pro~.
erties and adjacent to the highway.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRES THE FINDING OF AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION.

A
THE PRESUMPTION OF ADVERSE uSE
WAS NOT REBUTTED BY DEFENDANT.
The case of Zollinger v. Frank, (1946) 110 Utah
514, 175 P.2d 714, aligns the State of Utah with
the majority view as to the presumption existing in
this type of a case of adversity of use from open and
continuous use of an easement for more than breuty
years. The court discusses in that case the confusion
that has arisen in this field of the law from the use
of the words "hostile use" by various courts. It appears
that some courts have become confused in making determination of adverse use by the use of the "orri
"hostile" as distinguished from "peaceable." And in
laying down the correct rule of law in this regard, the
court states at page 517:
"Regardless of the words used to characterize
this element of the nature of the use necess,arr·
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1

'

to giYe n'ic to a prescriptive easement, it is our
opiwuu that the courts ~e~n t~at the use must
be o.r;11i 11st the owner as d1stmgmshed from under
the owner."
The court lays down the following rule of law in

acrnrdance with the majority rule, at page 518:
·'"re think the better rule is that described as
the prerniling rule in the above quotation. That
is, where a cbimant has shown an open and continuous use of the land for the prescriptive period
( :20 ~-ears 111 Utah) the use will be presumed to
haYe been against the owner and the owner of
the scnient estate to prevent the prescriptive
easement from arising has the burden of showing
that the 11~;e was under him instead of against
him."

Applying the rule of the Zollinger case to the case
at bar, plai11ti ifs established by undisputed testimony
some .J;5 yea re, ();· open and continuous use of the driveway in quest iu1:. l'-.ollowing such a showing, the defendants had !he burden of showing that the use was
under instead uf against defendants and defendants'
predecessor·, Defendants failed to make such a showing. In atte1Ept1ng to show that the use was under the
Whipples, th·= mdy thing defendants showed was that
the relatioml1ip between the parties was congenial and
friendly as rna.1· liaye been expected between brothersin-law arnl sders-in-law.

In opposition to this rule, the defendant cited the
case of L.1111t 1'. Kitchens ( 1953) 123 Utah 488, 260
p ~d 535, 't' controlling. The Kitchens case is no
11

authority for the trial judge's holding, for the re 1111111
that in the Kitchens case it was undisputed that lht
use started as a permissive use, or a license granted bi
the owner of the land in question. The court stated at
page 491:
"However, it is obvious that where a speeial
relationship such as a license exists, the mrner
of the land is entitled to more notice than the
mere use of his land not inconsistent with the
license. Thus it is said in the Restatement of
Property, pp. 458j
'Where a user of land and one having an in·
terest affected by the use have a relationship to
each other sufficient in itself to justify the use,
the use is not adverse unless knowledge of it1
adverse character is had by the one whose interest
is affected. The responsibility of bringing thi~
knowledge to him lies in the one making the nse.'
"In other words, the presumption of adversity
will not arise under mere use by a licensee and
knowledge of such use on the part of the lirensor
(Citing cases). The use cannot be adverse when
it rests upon license or mere neighborly accnm·
modation."
The basis for the holding in the Kitchens case rests
squarely on a clear and undisputed showing that the
use started as a license. This element is lacking in the
case at bar for the reason that there was no showing
that the Whipples originally constructed the bridge
on their own property and then allowed the Jones f:nn·
ily to use said bridge. To the contrary, the eridenee is
clear that the bridge was originally constructed !Jy
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hntlt the Jrn1c<.;es awl the 'Vhipples at a place where
t 1ras assumed that the bridge was between the two
1
properties. Joucs testified that he thought the bridge
intS one tl1inl or more on his property.
It is clear that if the use of an easement commences
anrl i:ontiuues being used by the parties with the mental
elemeut that the~' are using it as a matter of right and
not merely as a matter of permission that can be withJnnrn at any time, then the requisite situation for prescriptive use i~ established. In addition, the presumption establislwcl in the case of Harkness v. TVoodmansec
(18!Jl) 7 Utah :2~7, 26 P. 291, rests on a showing that
a way across property is originally opened by the land
owner on his own property and another later uses said
1ray. N"o such situation exists in the case at bar.

A thorough discussion showing the confusion that
has resulted from the use of the word "hostile" in de~cribing a<h-erse use is also contained in the dissent in
the case of Griff'iths v. Archibald (1954) 2 Utah 2d
293, 272 P.2d 586. It appears that such confusion is
the reason for the hol<ling in the case at bar, inasmuch
as the only thing that was shown by the defendant in
the case at bar was friendship and harmony between
tlic predecessors of the parties as distinguished from
hostility. The dissent states in part at page 299:
"The law does not require hostility between
the lls~r arnl the owner. nor that the use be against
the w1.ll, eontrary to his wishes or in spite of his
nppos1tio11. it requires a peaceful use under a
13

claim ~f right without active interfere11ce of tlii
owner.'
The Restatement of Property, in discussing thr
meaning of "adverse use" states, paragraph 458:
"A use of land is adverse to the owner of an
interest in land which is or may become pos~e.i
sory when it is
(a) Not made in subordination to him, and
(b) wrongful, or may be made by him wro1wf ul, as to him, and
b
( c) open and notorious."
In the comment to clause (a), the R estaltmcnl
states as follows:

"To be adverse it is not essential that a use be
hostile. It is not necessary that it he made either
in the belief or under a claim that it is legally
justified. It is, however, necessary that the one
making it shall not recognize in those as against
whom it is claimed to be adverse an authorit;·
either to prevent or to permit its continuance. It '
is the non-recognition of such authority at the
time a use is made which determines 'vhether it
is adverse. It must be made in non-recognition
of any such authority existing in the person as
against whom the use is claimed to be a<lrerse.

*

*

*

"Quite commonly, therefore, the absence or
submission to another is evidenced by the fad
that the one making the use did so under an
affirmative claim of right in himself."
Under the rule in the Restatement, if the partir:
originally intend an easement as distinguished frolll ::
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]/censr, the rf'(ptisite intent is established. The Restatement states in part, at page 2926, in its comment to
Clause (a):
"Thus, where a conveyance of an easement is
made under circumstances which prevent the
conveyance from being legally effective to create
the easement, a use made on the assumption that
the conveyance is legally effective is adverse."
Accordingly, when a person uses an easement with
the state of miwl that he is using it as a matter of right,
the use is adverse. The evidence shows such a use in
the easP at bar. There was no evidence that any person
using the joint driveway asked permission from any
.1ne at :rny time. This in itself shows that no person
felt it necessary to ask for permission. Accordingly, the
parties were using the driveway as a matter of right.
The rule established by the Zollinger case is based
on sound public policy that long-continued peaceful
enjoyment of real property rights should not be disturbed. 29 Harvard Law Review, page 90.

B

THE OVER,VHELMING WEIGHT OF
AUTHORITY SUPPORTS ADVERSE USER
rn JOINT DRIVEWAY CASES.
In discussing the law where a joint driveway has
hccn constructed by predecessors in title without any
1
J>ecifo· oral agreement, it is stated at 17A Am. J ur.,
L'!isnnrnts, 70 at p. 682:
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"In the great majority of cases in which .
lane, private road, alley, driveway, or passa"':''.
way lying over and along the boundary bebr;en
lots or tracts of land has been used without intti·
ruption by the adjoining owners for the fwi
prescr~ptive period, and for a common purpose,
and without any oral agreement therefor bem
shown, the user of each owner has been reganit~
as ~d;erse to the other ~nd the claim of a ptt·
scriphve easement by either party against thr '
other has been upheld."
This majority rule has also been cited in an extensire
annotation at 27 ALR 2d, page 341. This rule is also
stated in 28 C.J.S. Easements, par. 18 j:

"As stated in Corpus Juris, which has been
cited and quoted with approval, while there are
some decisions to the contrary, the weight ul ,
authority is to the effect that, where adjoining
proprietors lay out a way or alley between thei1
lands, each devoting a part of his own land tn
that purpose, and the way or alley is used for
the prescriptive period by the respectiYe 011·ner·
or their successors in title neither can ohstruc+
or close the part which is 'on his own land., .2nd
in these circumstances the mutual use ol t111
whole of the way or alley will be consid.e;e'I
adverse to a separate and exclusive use by e1tt1er ,
party."
1

1

The case preceding the aforementioned annota:: 111 '
in ALR 2d is the case of Plaza v. Flak, (1951) 7 ~J
· · t alier·
215, 81 A.2d 137. This case involved a JO!l1
between the properties of the parties and cited tli'.
majority rule as controlling, stating that the mutuni
, or way w1'II be co nsidererl
use of the whole of such alley
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adrerse to a separate or exclusive use by either. The
court. relying on the presumption established by the
20 \·ears of user, gives some examples of ways by which
a defendant in such a case can overcome such a presumption, stating:
·'He may overcome the presumptiop of adwrse use and the right to the easement arising
therefrom by proof of permission aske.I and
yrrmtcd, that it was secret user, or that it was
such use as to be neither physically capable of
prevention or of action." (Citing cases).
The rule followed in the Flak case conforms with
the reality of the situation presented in this type of case,
for it would indeed be stretching the imagination to
think that parties laying out a joint driveway and expending money and energy in maintaining said driveway and using the whole thereof for a great many years
without any conversation or without asking permission
from any one, would be doing so with any other intent
than that they are doing so as a matter of right. It
~eems that this same rule should apply whether the
onginal driveway was constructed pursuant to a contract or not, unless the contract was specifically that
it was a revocable license.
The court in the case of DeForrest v. Bunnie
'.1951), 207 Misc. 7, 107 N.Y.S.2d 396, held this doctrine applicable in a case where the parties by agreement had established the joint driveway with two
or three feet of said driveway on plaintiff's lot
and seven to eight feet on defendant' lot, where
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the parties had each paid one half of the cost of cuttm;
down the curb at the street and laying a concrete aprrii ,
The same rule was followed in the case of Ahtad ,
Boyer, (1949), 227 .Minn. 307, 37 N.,V.2d 372. TJt
case involved a joint driveway constructed on ~ix fee•
of defendant's property and four feet of plaintiff\ ,
property, pursuant to an oral agreement. The eomt !
held that the joint use for the prescriptin periH1
created the presumption that the use was adYerst. '.::
reply to the argument that the oral agreement shoulrl
create a presumption that it was a license or a per
missive use, the court held that the fact of an oral 1
I
agreement, if anything, would fortify the presumption :
that the use was adverse, stating:
,
1

1

"The conduct of the parties supports this pre·
sumption. Reasonable men would not surface a
driveway with a slab of concrete IO feet widr
-a type of construction designed to last for
many years-if only a temporary use were lll· 1
tended or if either pa~ty. thought tl~at the use
was to be merely perm1ss1ve and subject toter·
mination at any time. * * * Each party acq111 ,
esced in the assertion of a hostile right b)· h· .
neighbor. Acquiescence is the inactiYe statm ,;1
quiescence or unqualified submission to the.hoc· :
tile claim of another, and is not to be con,tuse,i i
with permission, which denotes a grant ol pei·
mission in fact or a license.

I

*

*

*

"Although a mere permissive user of. a w:i! .
over the land of another will not ripen mto :JL i
·
· is
· tilat where..
easement, the weight
of authority
adjoining owners jointly lay out a way betiree,
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their land, each devoting a part of his land to
that purpose, the use of the way by the respective
parties for the prescriptive period raises a presumption of the granting of an easement on the
theory that each party by his use thereof has
continuously asserted an adverse right in the
portion of the way lying on the other's land."
(Citing numerous cases) .
Another leading case is Jacobs v. Brewster (Mo.
1945), 3541 1\10. 729, 191 S.W.2d 894. Plaintiff's and
defendant's predecessors constructed a common driveway and a joint garage, splitting expenses and contributing approximately half of the property. The
eridence showed use of the driveway thereafter for
more than 10 years by the parties and their successors.
A letter was placed in evidence, written by defendant's
predecessor two years after the driveway was built,
stating that he wished to reserve the right to tear up
the driveway. The court held that this did not conclus!rely establish that the parties originally contracted
that the use was permissive only. The court stated that
the conduct of the parties and mutual use indicated
that they intended to create reciprocal easements. Citing
S1Jnford t. Kern, 223 Mo. 616, 122 S.W. 1051:
. "Each owner, by use of the driveway, is cont:nuously asserting an adverse right in the portion of the way on the other's l_ot."
The case of Gano v. Strickland, (Miss. 1951), 211
Jfis~. 511, 52 So.2d 11, also followed the majority
rul~. The parties owned adjoining property, their homes
hanng been built in 1903 and 1906. In 1906 a common
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driveway was built which included ffre feet on t:,
side of the property line, the total distance betweeu -Le
homes amounting to 15 feet. Each party built a gar:i:
in back which was reached by using the jomt drire 11 :1
The evidence showed that both parties used the ,lrir~- I
way jointly for longer than the preseripfae peri111: i
and that both made repairs in the drivewa:--. TJ;e C'(lltrl
in applying the majority rule and the presumption 111 I
adverse use from such e,·idence quoted the la11gua: .
heretofore quoted at 28 C.J.S., Easements, par. 11.'
at page 673.
1

I

The case of Johnson ·v. 1Vhclan, ct al., :Ok::i
1935), 171 Okla. 243, 42 P.2d 882, follows the ma.ioritr
rule. This case invoh·ed a driveway between iwrnh
owned by plaintiff and defendant. The e,·idence sbm1t1l
that the prior owners had jointly constructed a drit·
way intending half on each side, although a later q1nt 1
showed that there was more property on defenda11r·
side than on plaintiff's. The owners usecl the dri1ei,:r
jointly for more than 15 years. The defendant later b'l 11
an additional strip on her side of the 1lri1-e,1a>- :1111
threatened to construct a fence along the prnpert;· lit 1
The court stated at page 883:
,1

1

I

I

"Each owner after the clrivewav ,,.as p:11 " '
was by his use tl1ereof asserting an 'acln'rse n~;i
in the portion of the \rnv lavin(J' on the otlter·
land. And this use, 1i~n-ii11• ~ontiuuecl for 111 ":'
than 15 years, raises the p;~sumption of au e:iii·
ment which is appurtenant to tl1e other lot. I
. ble t11 ,
"To our view, the correct rule. app1ica

I
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the situation here, is laid down m 19 Corpus
Juris. at page 902, * * *."
Another case following the majority rule is Sinnett
,. Were/us (Idaho, 19Gl), 83 Idaho 5U, 365 P.2d 952.
The adjoiniug homes were built in 1919 with a 10-foot
strip between the homes. There was use by both owners
to gain access to garages and for coal deliYeries, etc.,
from 1919 to 19.,J,0. From 19.J.O to 194<2 there w'as a
partial restrictio11 when the appellant erected a fence
across a portion of the driYeway, the fence being remow<l in 1942. In 194<5 respondent's predecessor surfaced the driYeway with concrete, extending from the
garage along the driYeway between the houses from
which point concrete strips were laid and the common
use continued to 1959, when the action was commenced.
The court stated at page 955:
''Cases inrnlving similar facts and claimed
rights lrnve been considered by the courts of
many states arnl we are satisfied that the weight
of authority is to the effect that, where adjoining
propertv owners lav out a wav or alley between
their la~ds, each de~·oting a p;rt of his. own land
to that purpose, and such a way is used for the
pre:~criptiYe period by the respective owners or
their successors in title, neither can obstruct or
close tlie part which is on his own land. (Citing
cases).

*

*

*

"ender such circumstances the mutual use of
the whole of the wav or alley will be considered
ndnrse to separate' or excl~1sive use by either
party.
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"In 1llole11e Z'. 1'a11se,1;, 2013 Iowa 992, ~!J
N.,V. 759, 7()0, the t:ourt had uuder cousiuer:1
tion a case i1wolYi11g similar fads and said:

" ''Ye think it is sufficiently shown by U1e rei·
ord that the use of the 8-foot strip ~·dona Lie
diYision line between saicl two lots a~ a co1~m'1, '
driYeway for the benefit of both lot m111er.1. 11;1,
established by mutual agreement and ac(p1ie··
cence for such a period of time that eaeh par
has acquired a right of easement in the said sir;;,
for common purposes of a driYeway.' ''
The
cases in
majority
port this

foregoing cases are but a few of the mam
practically all j urisclictions adhering l,, t111
rule. See also the following ca~es whid1 111:1
rule :

Andrzejczyk v. Advo S,1pdem, Inc. (Conn.
Conn. 428, 151 A.2d 881;

19jfl·. lli

Sting v. Rotlwcker, (Ohio, 1947), 8:2 Ohio App.

111:

80 N.E.2d 819;

Ellsworth v. ]JI artin (Iowa, 19:29) , :208 Iowa HiG. ~:
N.,V. 417;
M aranr;i v. Domenici, (Calif., 1958), 1()1 Cal. App:
552, 326 p .2d 527;

Shanks v. Forum, (Ohio) 162 O.S.T . .J.79, .'55 O.Or·
385, 124 N.E.2d 416;
and numerous other decisions cited in the ALR auw
tation cited above.
The case of CarmodJJ v. Mulrooney, 87 Wis. jj~
58 N.,V. 1109, inrnlved adjoining properties ownedl
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limt/icr.1-in-lazc, where one having a private way from
his house to the highway allowed his brother-in-law
'dH, owned the adjoining land to use the way with him
for ZIJ years arnl more and both worked in building and
repairing the way, neither saying anything to the other
as tu the right of the brother-in-law to use it. It was
held that these faC'ts aff ordecl a presumption of a claim
(\f' right such as would establish a prescription.
The significance of neither party asking permission
from the other party is commented on in the Jf aran'ji
ease cited above, at page 531:

" * * * and the fact that plaintiff never asked
permission to use the driYeway suggests a claim
of right to do so."
COXCLUSION
The presumption of adverse use from over 20
)'ears' use of the driveway, not having been rebutted,
must stand and establishes the easement prayed for.
Defendants haYe failed to produce any evidence tending
to show that the use started as a permissive license.
The nnly eYiclence relied on by defendant to establish
this is the fact that the owners were brothers-in-law
and that there was a friendlv and congenial relationihip between them. It seem.s this element woukl be
in eyery JOmt
· · d rJYeway
·
· d out,
·nresent
'
case. A s pomte
a confusion has arisen in manv cases where the word
''adye " I
·
rse 1as heen strictly construed by courts to mean
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hostile or unfriendly. The trial court, falli11g into tL.,
error, held that the original parties <-Teatd a lic~ 1 ~,
as distingushed from an easement. The autlioritic, cite
show that adverse use is use as a matter of right as rb
tinguished from use as a matter of reyocable licetl\t
The reason for the presumption is stated in 1'iif11111.
Real Property, 3d Edition in par. 1196 (a):

"Since it is the recognition of a right iu tl:t
landowner to put an end to the user which de· .
priYes the user of the element of adYersenesi.
and such recognition is in its nature an affirm·
ative fact, the burden of proof in reference •
thereto is properly on the landowner, that is. :11 .
the absence of evidence to the contran-. the mer
of another's land is ordinarily presu~ned to br I
adverse."

1

The record shows that the predecessor~ of tht ~
parties jointly constructed a driwway 011 the bound:tr) I
line between the properties. No specific oral agree1w1:' 1
was shown. The evidence showecl continual 11..,agE J,, 1
the parties living on each side of the bouudan· h1 1
for approximately 45 years. The e,·idenee s!Jmr, t:./
work was performed by the parties on both sides. '!ii
evidence further shows that never at any time dirl :1 1:'
party ask permission of any other pa~·ty to use tli
driveway.
1

The cases cited herein dealin<r
with •J. oint clriwir:ll'
h
show this to be a classical situation which calls fnr t\ir
111
rule of the presumption laid down in the Zollinr
· accor d ance wit
. I1 t I1e grea t we1g
. I1t of " uth:int"
case m
· ·
in this country. This rule realistically holds that t\ir
0
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parties are not jointly using the driveway as a mere
matter of accommodation but are using the driveway
as n matter of right, clearly establishing adverse use.
In accordauce with public policy, such long-continued
adrerse use should not be disturbed. The parties on
both sides of the property line on each and every single
ua)· asserted by their open use and by their other actions
that they were using this driveway jointly as a matter
of right with neither party having the right to bar use
uf the whole driYeway to the other.
We respectfully submit that the error committed
by the trial court should be rectified and judgment
rerersed.
Respectfully submitted,
RA "''LINGS, 'V ALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK

JOHN L. BLACK
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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